Bank Resolution, Risk-Taking and Claimholders’ Bargaining Power by Heller, Yuval et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Bank Resolution, Risk-Taking and
Claimholders’ Bargaining Power
Heller, Yuval and Peleg Lazar, Sharon and Raviv, Alon
Bar-Ilan University, Tel Aviv University, Bar-Ilan University
10 January 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/102765/
MPRA Paper No. 102765, posted 09 Sep 2020 12:05 UTC
Bank Resolution, Risk-Taking and
Claimholders’ Bargaining Power ∗
Yuval Heller
Bar-Ilan University
Sharon Peleg Lazar
Tel Aviv University
Alon Raviv
Bar-Ilan University
September 1, 2020
Abstract
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are possible. Further, severe regulatory corrective measures might have adverse effects
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1 Introduction
As the size and complexity of financial institutions has increased, regulators’ ability to control
banks’ asset risk using traditional supervisory techniques, such as minimum capital require-
ments and supervisory review, has eroded. In response, regulators encourage banks to issue
unsecured debt, which is subordinated to their deposits (hereafter, subdebt). It is believed
that since the subdebtholders are sophisticated creditors they can increase banks’ trans-
parency (Hart and Zingales, 2011) and affect banks’ behavior (“direct discipline”) in a way
that is aligned with the deposit insurer’s incentive (Flannery, 2001; Chen, Goldstein, Huang,
and Vashishtha, 2020). Further, subdebtholders can indirectly discipline banks by providing
a signal of the banks’ risk to the regulator (Gorton and Santomero, 1990; Dewatripont and
Tirole, 1993).
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the use of debt as a monitoring tool has been ques-
tioned due to mixed evidence on its effectiveness. On the one hand, the empirical literature
finds that subdebt reduced banks’ risk-taking, both during the financial crisis and in the
following period (Nguyen, 2013; Belkhir, 2013; Danisewicz, McGowan, Onali, and Schaeck,
2018; Francis, Hasan, Liu, and Wang, 2019). On the other hand, financial institutions with
subdebt as part of their capital structure defaulted or were bailed out using taxpayers’ money
(Calomiris and Herring, 2013).1
The considerable amount of implicit guarantees and direct investment of taxpayers’
money during the 2008 financial crisis led regulators to adopt “bail-in” tools for manag-
ing the failure of banks without the usage of taxpayer money. In a bail-in event, the claims
of unsecured creditors of the failed bank are written down or converted into equity in order
to absorb the losses and recapitalize the bank without causing the disruption associated with
insolvency proceedings in financial institutions (Chennells and Wingfield, 2015). Crucially,
a bail-in is not negotiated at the time of distress; instead, it is imposed upon the bank and
its creditors by the authority responsible for bank resolution (Philippon and Salord, 2017).
Motivated by the inconsistent assessments of the ability of subdebt to mitigate risk-taking
that led to the introduction of bail-inable debt as a mandatory capital instrument, and the
adoption of reforms that can affect creditors’ bargaining power such as the introduction of
1The pre-crisis literature on the informativeness of subdebt yields on the issuing banks’ financial condition
presented mixed results as well (Gorton and Santomero, 1990; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Evanoff and Wall,
2001).
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banks’ mandatory stress tests (Goldstein and Leitner, 2018; Gofman, 2017), we study how
risk-taking is affected when replacing part of a bank’s common equity with subordinated
debt or with bail-inable debt, given the relative bargaining power of the debtholder. We
consider both the extreme cases where all bargaining power is in the hands of either the
stockholders or the debtholders, as well as the intermediate cases of intermediate levels of
bargaining power.
The analysis in the paper is conducted in two main steps. First, we model the fair value
of a bank’s different liabilities using a framework in which the bank’s assets are risky debt
claims. Next, we apply a game-theoretic approach to the strategic bargaining interaction
between the bank’s claimholders and its borrowers, to find the equilibrium level of asset risk.
In a framework where bank assets are risky debt claims, a bank’s asset is a loan to its bor-
rower. Therefore, the bank’s asset value and asset risk are derived from the borrower’s asset
value and asset risk (Dermine and Lajeri, 2001; Nagel and Purnanandam, 2020; Peleg Lazar
and Raviv, 2017). We assume that since banks are efficient at monitoring and limiting the
risk of their borrowers (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel, 1999; Ahn and Choi, 2009), the
borrower cannot increase its level of asset risk without the bank’s consent. Further, while
the regulator conducts periodic audits, setting the bank’s asset risk in accordance with its
policy, these audits are sufficiently infrequent that risk-shifting might occur between audit
events.2 Thus, a change in the bank’s asset risk might occur between audits if the bank and
the borrower agree on a new level of risk.
Consistent with the recent literature that shows that debtholders have an active role in
firms’ decision making, especially when the firm is in or near financial distress (Chava and
Roberts, 2008; Roberts and Sufi, 2009; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2012), we assume that a bank’s
preferred level of asset risk is the result of a bargaining process. The result of the bargaining
process depends on the relative bargaining power of the bank’s claimholders. This is done
by applying the well-known concept of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950;
Kalai, 1977).3 Specifically, we assume that risk-shifting occurs only if both the stockholders
2 Several papers suggest that since the regulator conducts on-site examinations of banks, it is better than
other claimants at uncovering negative information; however, the additional information that is revealed
becomes stale within a few months (Berger and Davies, 1998; DeYoung, Flannery, Lang, and Sorescu, 1998),
suggesting that risk-shifting is possible between audit events.
3The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is commonly applied to study situations in which players
have to make a joint decision, given a default outcome that is implemented if the players do not reach an
agreement. Recent applications of Nash bargaining solution to joint decisions of creditors and stockholders
are Hugonnier, Malamud, and Morellec (2015); Corbae and D’Erasmo (2017); see also Allen, Chapman,
Echenique, and Shum (2016) for an interbank loan market bargaining power analysis based the game core.
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and the debtholders are better off increasing asset risk.
We find that substituting a portion of a bank stock with subdebt decreases the range of
asset values for which risk-shifting takes place, since subdebtholders have an outside option
and therefore must be better off after the negotiation. When risk-shifting does occur in
equilibrium, the equilibrium level of asset risk is between the level that maximizes the value
of the stock and the level that maximizes the value of the subdebt, and this level of asset
risk decreases with the subdebtholders’ bargaining power. We show that the substitution of
part of a bank’s stocks with subdebt can increase the equilibrium level of asset risk if the
subdebtholders’ bargaining power is not sufficiently high. The intuition is that the increase
in subdebt, on the one hand, increases bank leverage, which should lead to an increase in
risk-taking, and, on the other hand, introduces monitoring efforts by the subdebtholders,
which should lead to a decrease in risk-taking. The answer to the question of which of these
two effects is stronger depends on the stockholders’ bargaining power.
As discussed above, we assume that risk-shifting occurs only if both the stockholders and
the subdebtholders of the bank are better off with it. This assumption implies that if there
is no agreement regarding the level of asset risk, risk is set to the initial level of risk. The
assumption can be motivated in two ways. First, the relationship between the claimholders
fits the case of a repeated game. Second, in case of disagreement the information regarding
risk-shifting is brought to the regulator who sets the level of asset risk back to its initial level.
Interestingly, we show that as the initial level of asset risk decreases, i.e., as the regulator is
stricter in audit periods, the threat of stricter corrective actions can have the adverse effect
of increasing the equilibrium level of asset risk.
The comparison between a bank with subdebt in its capital structure and a bank with no
such instrument, i.e., a bank financed with stock and deposits only, leads us to analyze the
new capital instrument that was introduced following the crisis: bail-in debt. We compare
a bank with bail-in debt in its capital structure with the previous two alternatives: (1)
non-bail-inable subdebt, and (2) no debt (the debt is substituted by stock). In our model,
bail-in debt is written down by a known percent at the time of financial distress. Therefore,
a bail-in event transfers value from the debtholders to the stockholders. Following a bail-in
event the regulator sets the bank’s level of asset risk to its initial level. This regulatory
behavior is in line with findings from Tsyplakov, Berger, Ongena, and Nistor (2020) who
show that regulators do intervene in banks’ decision-making following a bail-in event.4
4Another example of the regulator’s complex role in a bail-in event discussed in Walther and White
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We find that when bail-in debt is issued and there is risk-shifting, the equilibrium level
of asset risk is (1) between the level that maximizes the value of debt and the level that
maximizes the value of stock, and (2) increasing with the size of the write-down. The second
property can be explained by the fact that as the write-down increases, the stockholders’
position in case of no agreement improves. In addition, the range of asset values where risk-
shifting occurs is decreasing with the size of the write-down, meaning that as the transfer
from debtholders to stockholders increases, the range of asset values for which there is no
risk-shifting and a bail-in event occurs increases as well.
We extend the framework of analysis to address a concern raised in previous literature,
by allowing side payments between the stockholders and the subdebtholders.5 We solve the
model in this case in two steps. First, the stockholders and the subdebtholders jointly choose
the level of asset risk that maximizes the sum of their payoffs. Next, the side payment is
chosen as the unique Nash solution to the bargaining problem of dividing the joint payoff
between the two claimholders. We find that both the asset value threshold for risk-shifting
and the equilibrium level of asset risk, in the case of a bank with subdebt where side payments
are possible, are identical to those of a bank funded by just stock and deposits, with no
subdebt. In other words, if side payments are a concern, a mandatory requirement to issue
subdebt would not affect the level of risk in equilibrium.
Since the 2008 financial crisis, the issue of bank transparency has been heavily debated.
We contribute to the understanding of this issue by showing that more restrictive, yet in-
frequent, regulatory corrective measures in the form of a lower level of asset risk prescribed
at the time of an audit may motivate claimholders to agree on a higher level of asset risk
in the bargaining process. Thus, our analysis is complementary to Chen and Hasan (2011)
who show that less frequent audits lead to more risk-shifting. We strengthen this result by
showing that more restrictive measures taken at those infrequent audits lead to even more
risk-shifting between audits.
Our paper is part of the growing literature that deals with loss-absorbing liabilities in
banks. Studies (Raviv, 2004; Flannery, 2005; Chen, Glasserman, Nouri, and Pelger, 2017;
Glasserman and Nouri, 2012) have suggested the use of contingent capital, a debt instrument
(2020) is the signaling effect of a regulator-triggered bail-in event.
5Furlong and Keeley (1987) show that stockholders can compensate uninsured debtholders for increased
risk in the form of higher promised interest rates. Calomiris (1999) and Chen and Hasan (2011) discuss the
need to regulate the design of subordinated debt, including its maturity and maximum allowable yield, in
order to assure that subdebtholders are motivated to control stockholders’ risk-taking.
5
that can be converted into stock in time of distress, as a means of recapitalizing banks while
reducing reliance on taxpayers’ money. A special case of contingent convertible is bail-in
debt, which is known as “write-down debt”, where some of the debt is forgiven in time of
distress. Previous studies show that it can encourage risk-taking by banks (Pennacchi, 2010;
Hilscher and Raviv, 2014; Martynova and Perotti, 2018). Moreover, it is shown by Avdjiev,
Bogdanova, Bolton, Jiang, and Kartasheva (2020) that contingent capital with write-down
is vastly used by banks.
Our paper differs from this literature from a conceptual standpoint since we do not
assume that the stockholders of the bank determine the level of risk solely, but rather we
assume a bargaining process between the stockholders and the bail-in debtholders that may
be subject to regulatory intervention. Moreover, we assume that bank assets are risky debt
claims and therefore the value of assets is capped from above. As we use these assumptions,
the effect of bail-in debt on risk-taking and cost of deposit insurance is more subtle than
observed in the literature. We show that as the size of the debt write-down increases there
are fewer risk-shifting events but, when there is risk-shifting, it is to a higher level of asset
risk.6
Lastly, the paper is also related to the strand of the literature that studies the question of
whether mandatory disclosure of financial information can be welfare-improving (Goldstein
and Leitner, 2018; Frenkel, Guttman, and Kremer, 2020). In our paper the disclosure of
information by stockholders can be interpreted as an increase in debtholders’ bargaining
power.
The study of banking resolution in time of distress and its effect on risk-taking has been
a high priority during the Covid-19 pandemic, when there is a need to assess the risk of
many financial institutions negatively affected by the slowdown in business and the resulting
economic state (IMF, 2020; De Vito and Gomez, 2020). The decrease in borrowers’ asset
value, in fact, leads to an increase in banks’ leverage ratio and cost of default (Reinders,
Schoenmaker, and Van Dijk, 2020).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model and the
liability structures of the bank and its borrower and expresses the values of their different
claims. Section 3 discusses the different claimholders’ risk preferences. We present the
6By contrast, when a bail-in has a high conversion ratio, i.e., the stockholders are highly diluted, both
empirical (Giuliana, 2019) and theoretical (Lambrecht and Tse, 2019) papers suggest that bail-in debt
increases market discipline.
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bargaining model and its solution in Section 4. In Section 5 we present two extensions of
our model and analyze the effect of side payments and bail-in debt. Section 6 presents a
numerical example of results, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
A corporation is funded by stock with market value SC and by a single loan with face value
FC and market value BC . The loan is a zero-coupon loan maturing at time T and the bank
is its sole creditor. The bank is funded by stock with a market value of SB, deposits with a
face value of FDep and a market value of BDep, and zero-coupon debt, which is subordinated
to the deposits (subdebt) and has a face value of FSub and a market value of BSub. We define
deposits as debt claims that mature at the time of a regulatory audit, T , following Marcus
and Shaked (1984) and Ronn and Verma (1986).7 Following a similar logic, we assume that
the subdebt matures at time T as well.
The corporation’s asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion. The bank’s asset is
the loan to the corporation and therefore the bank’s asset value and the bank’s level of asset
risk depend on its borrower’s asset value and its borrower’s level of asset risk; i.e., the bank’s
asset risk is a function of the borrower’s asset value and the volatility of the assets.
The bank can monitor and limit its borrower’s risk-taking, so that the corporation can
only increase the level of its asset risk with the consent of the bank. We assume that the
bank’s depositors are unable and unmotivated to monitor the bank and therefore they are not
an active agent in the model (Cooper and Ross, 2002). The risk of the bank is determined in a
bargaining process between its stockholders and subdebtholders as discussed in Section 4. For
comparison, we also consider the case where risk is determined solely by the stockholders and
the case where risk is determined solely by the subdebtholders with no bargaining (Section
3).
We assume a regulator that conducts periodic audits to assess and align the bank’s level
of asset risk with the regulatory policy.8 However, at the time of an audit the regulator
7This is also consistent with the finding of Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) who show that supervisory
assessments following an on-site inspection (audit) are more accurate than the market in predicting changes
in bank performance.
8The question of what is the optimal level of asset risk that should be set at the time of a regulatory
audit as well as the relation between the optimal level and the actual level that the regulator chooses is
beyond the scope of our analysis.
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can force some level of risk, which we call the initial level of risk, σ0. We assume audits
are sufficiently infrequent, such that the bank’s claimholders have sufficient time to shift the
bank’s level of asset risk between audits by allowing the borrower to change its level of asset
risk. In our model, we focus on such points in time and inquire into the conditions under
which risk-shifting can occur.
Throughout the paper the objective of each claimholder is to maximize the market value
of its claim. In what follows we study the preferences of the different claimholders at time
t ∈ (0, T ) – after the loan contract is set but before the time of the next audit, i.e., before
the time of debt maturity.
In the rest of this section we describe in detail the liability structures of the bank and
of the borrower and express the value of their different claims. For convenience, all the
notations are summarized in Appendix A.
2.1 The borrower’s liability structure
The value of the corporation’s assets, VC , under the risk-neutral measure follows a geometric
Brownian motion according to the following equation:
dVC,t = rVC,tdt+ σVC,tdW,
where r is the instantaneous risk-free rate of return, σ is the instantaneous volatility of the
corporation’s assets, and dW is a standard Wiener process under the risk-neutral probability
measure.
A default event occurs at debt maturity, T , if the corporation’s asset value, VC,T , is lower
than the face value of its debt. If default occurs, the bank receives the residual assets of the
borrowing corporation, VC,T . Otherwise, debt is fully paid and the creditor receives the total
face value of debt, FC . Therefore, the payoff to the corporation’s creditors at debt maturity
is equal to BC,T = min[VC,T , FC ]. This expression can be rearranged and expressed as
BC,T = FC −max[FC − VC,T , 0]. (1)
As suggested by Merton (1974), this payoff is equivalent to the payoff of a risk-free debt
with a face value of FC and a short position in a European put option. Therefore, the
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present value of the corporation’s debt is given by
BC,t = FC · e−r(T−t) − Putt(VC,t, FC , σ, T − t, r),
where Putt(VC,t, FC , σ, T − t, r) is the value at time t of a European put option on the
corporation’s asset value and the option’s strike price is equal to the face value of it’s debt
FC . Under the above-described geometric Brownian motion the value of the option can be
found using the standard Black and Scholes (1973) equation.
Since the borrower’s stock is the residual claim, its payoff at debt maturity is SC,T =
max[VC,T − FC , 0]. This payoff can be replicated by a European call option on the value of
the corporation’s assets, with a strike price equal to the face value of its debt (Galai and
Masulis, 1976). Therefore the value of stock at time t is
SC,t = Callt(VC,t, FC , σ, T − t, r),
where Callt(VC,t, FC , σ, T − t, r) is the value of a European call option according to the Black
and Scholes (1973) equation.
2.2 The bank’s liability structure
Since the bank’s asset is the loan that funds the activity of the corporation, described in Eq.
(1), we can express the payoff of the bank’s assets at maturity as
VB,T = BC,T = FC −max[FC − VC,T , 0]. (2)
Depositors The depositors are the senior claimholders of the bank and their payoff at
time T is the minimum between the value of the bank’s assets and the face value of its
deposits: BDep,T = min [VB,T , FDep]. Rearranging under the assumption that the face value
of the corporation’s debt is higher than the face value of the bank’s deposits,9 FC > FDep we
can express the depositor’s payoff at maturity as BDep,T = FDep −max[FDep − VC,T , 0]. This
payoff can be replicated by a long position in a risk-free debt with a face value of FDep and a
short position in a European put option on the borrower’s assets, with a strike price equal to
9As the bank funds the borrower’s loan using both stock and debt, the face value of the borrower’s debt,
FC , must be higher than the face value of the bank’s own debt, (FDep + FSub), and, therefore, also higher
than FDep.
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the face value of the bank’s deposits. Therefore, the value of the deposits at any time t prior
to debt maturity can be expressed as BDep,t = FDep · e−r(T−t) − Putt(VC,t, FDep, σ, T − t, r).
The bank’s issued debt The subdebtholders receive at debt maturity a face value of
FSub if the value of the borrower’s assets is above the bank’s total face value of debt. Other-
wise, their payoff is the maximum between zero and the difference between the value of the
borrower’s assets and the face value of the bank’s deposits. This payoff can be rearranged
and expressed as
BSub,T = max [VC,T − FDep, 0]−max [VC,T − (FDep + FSub), 0] ,
which is equivalent to a long position in a European call option with a strike price equal to
the face value of the bank’s deposits, FDep, and a short position in a European call option
with a strike price equal to the face value of the bank’s total debt, (FDep+FSub). Therefore,
the value of the subdebt prior to debt maturity is
BSub,t = Callt(VC,t, FDep, σ, T − t, r)− Callt(VC,t, FDep + FSub, σ, T − t, r). (3)
Stock Since the bank’s stockholders are the residual claimholders, their payoff at maturity
is SB,T = max [VB,T − (FDep + FSub) , 0]. If the bank is solvent at maturity, the stockhold-
ers receive a payoff of FC − (FDep + FSub), which is the maximum payoff that the bank’s
stockholders can receive. This differs from the basic contingent claims approach in which
the stockholders’ payoff is unbounded from above. When we expand this payoff it can be
expressed as
SB,T = max[VC,T − (FDep + FSub), 0]−max[VC,T − FC , 0].
The payoff of the stock can be replicated by a long position in a European call option,
with a strike price equal to the face value of the bank’s total debt, (FDep + FSub), and a
short position in a European call option, with a strike price equal to the face value of the
corporation’s debt, FC . Therefore, the value of the bank’s stock prior to debt maturity is
SB,t = Callt(VC,t, FDep + FSub, σ, T − t, r)− Callt(VC,t, FC , σ, T − t, r). (4)
The value of the bank’s assets and the payoff to each of the bank’s claimholders at debt
maturity is described in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The bank’s asset value and the payoffs to the bank’s depositors, subdebtholders,
and stockholders at debt maturity. The face value of the borrower’s debt is FC = 80. The face value
of the bank’s deposits is FDep = 60 and the face value of its subdebt is FSub = 10.
3 Sensitivity of the claimholders to asset risk
The main goal of our paper is to find the equilibrium level of asset risk under different
levels of bargaining power of the bank’s claimholders. This analysis enables us to find the
cost of deposit insurance of banks with different capital structures and different levels of
claimholders’ bargaining power. Therefore, in this section we first study the sensitivity to
asset risk of the stock of the borrower and of the liabilities issued by the bank (debt and
equity). The analysis in this section is mostly not novel to our paper and is based on
previous contributions. However, it is presented as it is essential for the understanding of
our framework of analysis presented in Section 4. Further, the analysis in this chapter yields
the benchmark results where there is no bargaining by the claimholders and one of them
controls the level of asset risk. Moreover, since we study the equilibrium level of risk of a
bank with subdebt as part of its capital structure, it is essential to make a comparison to the
alternative benchmark case, which is a bank with no subdebt as part of its capital structure,
11
and instead has only deposits and stock.
3.1 Risk preferences of the stockholders of the borrower
In line with the classic agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the stockholders of the
borrower (the borrowing corporation) are always better off increasing the level of asset risk.
We omit the proof of this well-known standard result, which is implied by the fact that the
value of a call option is strictly increasing with the level of risk of the underlying asset.
Claim 1. The value of the stock of the bank’s borrower is increasing with the level of asset
risk.
This claim implies that the borrower’s stockholders always prefer the highest level of
asset risk allowed by the bank and would never agree to decrease risk. Therefore, in the
rest of our analysis we focus on the maximum allowed level of the borrower’s asset risk as
chosen by the agents controlling the bank’s decision-making, which must be weakly higher
than the initial level of asset risk in order for the stockholders of the borrower to agree. We
assume that this maximum allowed level of risk is feasible given the technological limitations
governing the borrower’s assets, and that the borrower’s shareholders always shift the level
of asset risk to it.
3.2 Auxiliary result: Sensitivity to risk of bull spread
The payoffs to both the bank’s stockholders (Eq. (4)) and its subdebtholders (Eq. (3)) are
equivalent to a portfolio of two call options with the same maturity date on the value of the
borrower’s assets, where each payoff is defined by options with different strike prices. The
value of such a position is known among options traders and investors as a “bull spread.”
Both payoffs can be represented, generally, as
Pt(Vt, F1, F2, σ, T − t, r) = Callt(Vt, F1, σ, T − t, r)− Callt(Vt, F2, σ, T − t, r),
where Vt is the asset value at time t, F1 < F2 denote the strike prices of the call options,
T − t is the time, and r is the instantaneous risk-free rate of return.
Define the following two threshold values 0 < H∗∗ < H∗ as
H∗(F1, F2, T − t, r) ≡ e−r(T−t)
√
F1 · F2 (5)
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and
H∗∗(F1, F2, T − t, r, σ0) ≡ e
−
(
r+
σ20
2
)
(T−t)√
F1 · F2, (6)
and for each Vt < H
∗ define the payoff-maximizing asset risk σmax as
σmax(F1, F2, T − t, r, Vt) ≡
√
1
T − t ln
(
F1 · F2
(Vt)
2
)
− 2r. (7)
The following auxiliary result characterizes the value Pt of a portfolio of two call options
with strike prices F1 < F2 as a function of the asset risk. It exhibits four key properties. The
portfolio value is (1) decreasing with the asset risk if Vt > H
∗, and (2) hump-shaped in the
asset risk if Vt < H
∗. In this latter case, (3) the maximum of the portfolio value is obtained
for the level of risk σmax, and (4) the level of asset risk that maximizes the portfolio’s value
is higher than σ0 if and only if Vt > H
∗∗. Formally,
Proposition 1. The value of the portfolio Pt(Vt, F1, F2, σ, T − t, r) is (1) decreasing with the
value of asset risk σ if Vt > H
∗(F1, F2, T − t, r, ), and (2) hump-shaped (unimodal) in the
asset risk if Vt < H
∗(F1, F2, T − t, r, ). In this latter case the maximum is obtained for the
level of asset risk σmax(F1, F2, T − t, r, Vt). Moreover, the maximizing level is higher than σ0
(i.e., σmax(F1, F2, T − t, r, Vt) > σ0) if and only if Vt < H∗∗(F1, F2, T − t, r, σ0).
The proof, which is presented in Appendix B.1, mostly summarizes existing results: the
threshold of asset value is developed in Black and Cox (1976) and Gorton and Santomero
(1990), and the level of asset risk is derived in Peleg Lazar and Raviv (2017).
3.3 Bank stockholders’ risk preferences
Since the value of the bank’s stock, as described in Eq. (4), is equal to the value of a portfolio
composed of a call option with a strike price of (FDep+Fsub), minus the value of a call option
with a strike price of FC , Proposition 1 applies to it. Therefore, we define the thresholds as
H∗Stk ≡ e−r(T−t)
√
(FDep + FSub) · FC (8)
and
H∗∗Stk ≡ e
−
(
r+
σ20
2
)
(T−t)√
(FDep + FSub) · FC , (9)
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and the level of asset risk that maximizes the value of the stock, σmaxStk , as
σmaxStk ≡ argmax
σ
SB =
√√√√ 1
T − t ln
(
(FDep + Fsub) · FC
(VC,t)
2
)
− 2r. (10)
Thus, we can summarize the relationship between the value of the stock and the borrower’s
asset value and risk in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The value of the bank’s stock is (1) decreasing with the value of its borrower’s
asset risk if H∗Stk < VC,t, and (2) hump-shaped (unimodal) in the asset risk if H
∗
Stk > VC,t,
and, in this case, its maximum is obtained for the level of asset risk σmaxStk . Moreover, the
level of asset risk that maximizes the value of the bank’s stock is higher than the initial level
of asset risk (i.e., σmaxStk > σ0) if and only if VC,t < H
∗∗
Stk.
The proof is immediate from Eq. (4) and Proposition 1.
Since, when the value of the asset is below H∗∗Stk, the value of the stock is hump-shaped
with respect to asset risk and the maximum value is received with a level of asset risk greater
than the initial level of asset risk, we can derive the following corollary.
Corollary 2. When the bank’s stockholders control the bank and therefore can enforce their
choice of an upper bound on the borrower’s asset risk, risk-shifting occurs if and only if
VC,t < H
∗∗
Stk. When there is risk-shifting, the level of asset risk increases to σ
max
Stk .
The level of asset risk preferred by the bank’s stockholders, σmaxSB , is an increasing function
of both the borrower’s leverage, FC/VC,t, and the leverage of the bank, (FDep + Fsub)/VC,t.
Thus, the level of asset risk preferred by the bank’s stockholders depends on the financial
risk of both the bank and of its borrower. In addition, since the face value of the bank’s debt
is lower than that of the borrower’s debt, the threshold H∗∗Stk is lower than the face value of
the borrower’s debt. Thus, risk-shifting is limited to states where the bank’s borrower is in
financial distress and the maximum level of asset risk is limited to σmaxStk , the level of asset
risk that maximizes the value of the stock.10
10Since the bank’s stockholders’ payoff is limited from above, their utility from the level of asset risk
is hump-shaped. This would not be the case if the bank’s asset value was unbounded, in which case the
equilibrium level of asset risk would be unbounded as well (see the related analysis in Heller, Peleg Lazar,
and Raviv, 2019).
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Remark 1. Throughout the analysis we assume that the value of the bank’s asset is limited
from above by the face value of the borrower’s loan. However, our results can be adapted to
a setup in which the value of the bank’s asset is not capped, and follows a standard geometric
Brownian motion. Specifically, an uncapped bank’s asset value can be approximated in our
model by assuming that the face value of the borrower’s debt FC is very large relative to the
borrower’s asset value (i.e., by assuming that FC >> VC). By looking at the limit in which
FC →∞ one can apply the formulas presented in the paper to obtain the equilibrium level
of asset risk obtained when the bank’s asset value is not capped.
3.4 Bank subdebtholders’ risk preferences
Since, as shown in Black and Cox (1976) and formulated in Eq. (3), the value of the bank’s
subdebt is equal to a portfolio of a call option with a strike price of FDep minus the value of
a call option with a strike price of (FDep + Fsub), Proposition 1 applies to it. Therefore we
define the thresholds as
H∗Sub ≡ e−r(T−t)
√
FDep · (FDep + Fsub) (11)
and
H∗∗Sub ≡ e
−
(
r+
σ20
2
)
(T−t)√
(FDep + FSub) · FDep, (12)
and the level of asset risk that maximizes the value of the subdebt, σmaxSub , as
σmaxSub ≡ argmax
σ
BSub,t(σ) =
√
1
T − t ln
(
(FDep + Fsub) · FDep
(VC,t)2
)
− 2r, (13)
which allows us to apply Proposition 1 to the bank’s subdebt in the following corollary.
Corollary 3. The market value of the subdebt claim is (1) decreasing with the level of the
borrower’s asset risk if H∗Sub < VC,t, and (2) hump-shaped (unimodal) in the level of asset
risk if H∗Sub > VC,t, and, in this case, its maximum is obtained for the level of asset risk
σmaxSub . Moreover, the level of asset risk that maximizes the value of the subdebt is higher than
the initial level of risk (i.e., σmaxSub > σ0) if and only if VC,t < H
∗∗
Sub.
The proof is immediate from Eq. (3) and Proposition 1.
Since, when the value of the asset is below H∗∗Sub, the value of the subdebt is hump-shaped
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with respect to asset risk, and the maximum value of the subdebt is received when the value
of risk is greater than the initial level of asset risk, we can derive the following corollary.
Corollary 4. When the subdebtholders control the bank’s decisions, risk-shifting occurs if
and only if VC,t < H
∗∗
Sub. When there is risk-shifting, the level of asset risk increases to σ
max
Sub .
Observe that even when the subdebtholders have full control of the bank’s risk-taking,
risk-shifting is not avoided completely. However, the subdebtholders’ risk-taking motivation
is less pronounced than the shareholders’ in the following two ways: (1) when the borrower’s
asset value is between H∗∗Sub and H
∗∗
Stk, risk-shifting occurs only when the bank is controlled
by the stockholders and does not occur when it is controlled by the subdebtholders and (2)
when the corporation’s asset value is below H∗∗Sub, there is risk-shifting in both cases, but
the risk-shifting is less pronounced when the bank is controlled by the subdebtholders, i.e.,
σmaxSub < σ
max
Stk . These differences are presented in Figure 2.
3.5 Bank with no subdebt
In this section we analyze a bank with no subdebt as part of its capital structure, where the
level of asset risk between audit periods is set solely by the bank’s stockholders (Peleg Lazar
and Raviv, 2017). This case is an important benchmark that allows us to compare the
equilibrium level of risk with the alternative capital structure that includes subdebt.
The bank is funded by deposits with a face value of FDep and stock. Since the stockholders
are the residual claimholders, their payoff at maturity is SNoSubB,T = max [VB,T − FDep, 0].
When we expand this payoff it can be expressed as SNoSubB,T = max[VC,T−FDep, 0]−max[VC,T−
FC , 0]. This payoff can be replicated by a long position in a European call option, with a
strike price equal to the face value of the bank’s debt, FDep, and a short position in a
European call option, with a strike price equal to the face value of the corporation’s debt,
FC . Therefore, the value of the bank’s stock prior to debt maturity is
SNoSubB,t = Callt(VC,t, FDep, σ, T − t, r)− Callt(VC,t, FC , σ, T − t, r). (14)
Proposition 1 applies to this case and therefore we define the thresholds as
H∗NoSub ≡ e−r(T−t)
√
FDep · FC (15)
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and
H∗∗NoSub ≡ e
−
(
r+
σ20
2
)
(T−t)√
FDep · FC , (16)
and the level of risk that maximizes the value of the stock, σmaxNoSub, as
σmaxNoSub ≡ argmax
σ
SNoSubB,t (σ) =
√
1
T − t ln
(
FDep · FC
(VC,t)2
)
− 2r, (17)
which allows us to apply Proposition 1 to the bank’s stockholders in the following corollary.
Corollary 5. The market value of the stock claim in a bank with no subdebt is (1) decreasing
with the borrower’s level of asset risk if H∗NoSub < VC,t, and (2) hump-shaped (unimodal) in
the level of asset risk if H∗NoSub > VC,t, and, in this case, its maximum is obtained for the
level of asset risk σmaxNoSub. Moreover, the level of asset risk that maximizes the value of the
subdebt is higher than the initial level of risk (i.e., σmaxNoSub > σ0) if and only if VC,t < H
∗∗
NoSub.
The proof is immediate from Eq. (14) and Proposition 1.
Since, when the value of the asset is below H∗∗NoSub, the value of the stock is hump-shaped
with respect to asset risk and maximized with a level of risk that is above the initial level of
asset risk, we can derive the following corollary.
Corollary 6. When a bank is funded by stock and deposits only, i.e., is not funded by
subdebt, risk-shifting occurs if and only if VC,t < H
∗∗
NoSub. When there is risk-shifting, the
level of asset risk increases to σmaxNoSub.
The analysis of the risk preferences of the stockholders of a bank with deposits and
stock enables us to compare the degree of risk-shifting with an all-else-equal bank except
for part of the stock being replaced with subdebt. When the level of risk is controlled by
the stockholder, risk-taking in a bank with subdebt occurs whenever the value of assets
is below the discounted geometric mean of the face value of the borrowers’ debt and the
face value of the bank’s total debt, H∗∗Stk. In a bank with no subdebt, risk-shifting occurs
whenever the value of assets is below the discounted geometric mean of the face value of the
borrower’s debt and the face value of the deposits, H∗∗NoSub. Since H
∗∗
Stk > H
∗∗
NoSub there are
less risk-shifting events in a bank with no subdebt than in a bank with subdebt where risk is
determined solely by the stockholder. Moreover, when risk-shifting occurs, the chosen level
of risk is lower since σmaxNoSub < σ
max
Stk . The increased amount of risk-shifting in a bank with
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Figure 2: The equilibrium level of the borrower’s asset risk. The figure depicts the equilibrium
levels of asset risk in a bank with subdebt that is controlled by stockholders (Section 3.3), a bank with
subdebt controlled by subdebtholders (Section 3.4), and a bank with no subdebt (Section 3.5). The face
value of the borrower’s debt is FC = 80. The face value of the bank’s deposits is FDep = 60 and the face
value of its subordinated debt is Fsub = 10. The initial level of asset risk is σ0 = 10%. In addition, the time
to maturity is one year and the risk-free rate is r = 1%.
subdebt can be explained by the higher leverage of the bank in which stock is replaced by
subdebt.
When the bank’s subdebtholders solely determine the level of asset risk, risk-shifting
occurs whenever the asset value is below the discounted geometric mean of the bank’s total
face value of debt and the face value of deposits, H∗∗Sub. Since H
∗∗
NoSub > H
∗∗
Sub there are
fewer risk-shifting events in a bank with subdebt where risk is determined solely by the
subdebtholders than in a bank with no subdebt. Moreover, when risk-shifting occurs the
chosen level of risk is lower since σmaxSub < σ
max
NoSub. These results are presented in Figure 2.
4 Bargaining analysis
While in the previous section we show the risk preference of each claimholder, an analysis
that fits the case where a single claimholder controls the level of risk of the bank’s borrower,
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in this section we turn to the analysis of the bargaining game, where any change in the
level of asset risk requires the mutual consent of both the stockholders and subdebtholders.
Specifically, we assume that regardless of the bargaining power of each claimholder, an
increase in the level of asset risk occurs only if the two claimholders are better off with it.
Therefore, regardless of the bargaining power of each claimholder, an increase in the level of
asset risk occurs only if the two claimholders are better off with it, i.e., when the value of
each claim is greater than its value at the initial level of risk that was set at the time of the
audit. Thus, an increase in the level of asset risk that leads to a higher stock and subdebt
value must be at the expense of the other claimholders: the depositors or the deposit insurer.
A necessary condition for the described bargaining process is that subdebtholders can
observe the level of asset risk. Thus, a regime shift from the case where only the stockholders
determine the level of risk to the case with bargaining can be a result of a change in investor
sophistication or an increase in asset transparency, such as the one brought about by the
disclosure rules that followed Basel III (Chen, Goldstein, Huang, and Vashishtha, 2020).
4.1 Analysis of the bargaining game
As is common in the game-theoretic literature, we model the strategic interaction as a
bargaining situation (see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990, Chapter 7, for a textbook
introduction). Specifically, we assume that an exogenous parameter α ∈ [0, 1] describes the
bargaining power of the stockholders relative to the subdebtholders. The case of α = 1
(α = 0) corresponds to a state in which the stockholders (subdebtholders) hold all the
bargaining power; i.e., the stockholders (subdebtholders) present a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer
regarding the maximal allowed level of asset risk, and the subdebtholders (stockholders) can
either accept or reject this offer, without an opportunity to present a counteroffer. The case
where α = 0.5 corresponds to a symmetric state, where both claimholders possess the same
bargaining power.
The solution concept we apply to capture the joint decision of the stockholders and
the subdebtholders is the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950; Kalai, 1977;
see Footnote 3 for recent applications of the Nash bargaining solution in related setups),
according to which the maximal level of asset risk that is chosen at the end of the bargaining
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process is
σmaxα = argmax σ≥σ0
SB,t(σ)≥SB,t(σ0)
BSub,t(σ)≥BSub,t(σ0)
(
(SB,t (σ)− SB,t (σ0))α · (BSub,t (σ)− BSub,t (σ0))1−α
)
.
(18)
4.2 Solution of the bargaining game
The following proposition characterizes the maximal level of asset risk σmaxα jointly chosen
by the stockholders and the subdebtholders. Specifically, it shows that (1) the condition for
risk-shifting is the same as in the case where the bank is controlled by the subdebtholder,
and (2) if there is risk-shifting, the level of asset risk is increasing with α, and it is between
the level of risk chosen by the stockholders and the level of risk chosen by the subdebtholders
(a comparison of the solution of this case with those of the two previous cases is presented
in Table 1 below).
Proposition 2. When the bank is jointly controlled by subdebtholders and stockholders, risk-
shifting occurs if and only if VC,t < H
∗∗
Sub. When there is risk-shifting, the level of asset risk
σmaxα is (1) increasing with α, and (2) between the level of asset risk decided upon in the case
of sole control by the subdebtholders and the level decided upon in the case of sole control by
the stockholders (i.e., σmaxSub ≤ σmaxα ≤ σmaxStk ).
The proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix B.2.
Introducing subdebt in a bank financed by just stock and deposits, i.e., substituting a
portion of stock with subdebt, decreases the range of asset values for which risk-shifting takes
place from the range VC,t < H
∗∗
NoSub to the range VC,t < H
∗∗
Sub. This result is demonstrated
in Figure 3.
Introducing subdebt in a bank financed by just stock and deposits, i.e., substituting a
portion of stock with subdebt, may increase the equilibrium level of asset risk if the sub-
debtholders’ bargaining power is not sufficiently high. The increase in subdebt on the one
hand increases bank leverage, which should increase risk-taking, and on the other hand,
introduces supervision by the subdebtholders, which should decrease risk-taking. The an-
swer to the question of which of these two effects is stronger depends on the stockholders’
bargaining power.
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Figure 3: The equilibrium level of the borrower’s asset risk with bargaining. The figure depicts
the equilibrium levels of the borrower’s asset risk in a bank with subdebt where the level of asset risk
is determined in a bargaining process between the bank’s claimholders (as defined in Eq. (18)) for three
different values of the stockholders’ bargaining power relative to that of the subdebtholders: (1) α = 0.8, (2)
α = 0.5, and (3) α = 0.2. In addition, the figure depicts the equilibrium levels of asset risk in a bank with
subdebt that is controlled by stockholders (Section 3.3), a bank with subdebt controlled by subdebtholders
(Section 3.4), and a bank with no subdebt (Section 3.5). The face value of the borrower’s debt is FC = 80.
The face value of the bank’s deposits is FDep = 60 and the face value of its subordinated debt is Fsub = 10.
The initial level of asset risk is σ0 = 10%. In addition, the time to maturity is one year and the risk-free
rate is r = 1%.
4.3 Illustration
We demonstrate the motivation of the bank’s subdebtholders and stockholders in Figure 4.
In our base-case analysis, the face value of the borrower’s loan is 80, the face value of the
subdebt is 10, and the face value of the deposits is 60. The risk-free rate is 1% and the time
to maturity is one year.
When the borrower’s asset value is above the subdebtholders’ threshold, VC,t > H
∗∗
Sub, for
example, when VC,t = 70, as depicted in Figure 4a, the subdebtholders will not agree to any
increase in the level of asset risk above its initial level since such an increase would decrease
the value of their claim.
By contrast, as depicted in Figure 4b, when the borrower’s asset value is low, VC,t = 62,
the relationship between the subdebt value and the asset risk is hump-shaped. Therefore,
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Table 1: Summary of Risk-shifting Analysis
Control & bargaining Corporation’s asset value (VC)
framework VC > H
∗∗
Stk VC ∈ (H∗∗NoSub, H∗∗Stk) VC ∈ (H∗∗Sub, H∗∗NoSub) VC < H∗∗Sub
Stockholders Risk-shifting to σmaxStk
control the bank
No subdebt No risk- Risk-shifting to σmaxNoSub ∈ (σmaxSub , σmaxStk )
Joint control shifting No risk-shifting Risk-shifting to
No risk-shifting σmaxα ∈ (σmaxSub , σmaxStk )
Subdebtholders Risk-shifting to
control the bank σmaxSub
when the initial level of asset risk is below the level that maximizes the value of subdebt, the
subdebtholders are better off increasing the level of asset risk to a level between the initial
level of asset risk and the level of asset risk for which the value of the subdebt is identical to
its value at the initial level of asset risk. This level is defined as σ0 and equals 64% in this
specific example.
Since usually both stock and subdebt are traded financial instruments, one might assume
that the regulator can use these instruments’ market value to indicate a risk-shifting event
between two audit periods (“indirect market discipline”). However, this is not a straightfor-
ward task, since risk-shifting is expected to increase the market value of both the stock and
the subdebt, making it indistinguishable from an increase in the borrower’s asset value. For
example, when α = 0.8 the equilibrium level of risk is σmaxα=0.8(10%) = 40.6%, which is between
the risk preferred by the stockholders, 59.7%, and the risk preferred by the subdebtholders,
26.2%, and both the value of stock and subdebt increases relative to their value at the initial
level of risk. Note that a decrease in the market value of deposits coinciding with an increase
in the market values of stock and subdebt would be an indication of risk-shifting, if the
bank’s deposits or deposit insurance were traded securities with an observed market value.
4.4 The effect of the initial level of asset risk
One can interpret the initial level of the borrower’s asset risk σ0 as the maximal level of risk
approved by the regulator when monitoring the bank. That is, at the time of each audit
event the regulator ensures that the level of asset risk is not higher than σ0. Thus, a lower σ0
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(a) The corporation’s asset value: VC = 70
(b) The corporation’s asset value: VC = 62
Figure 4: The values of the bank’s stock and subordinated debt as a function of the level of
the asset risk of the borrower. The dashed lines represent the value of the bank’s subdebt and the value
of its stock at the initial level of asset risk of σ0 = 10%. The face value of the borrower’s debt is FC = 80.
The face value of the bank’s deposits is FDep = 60 and the face value of its subordinated debt is FSub = 10.
These face values yield for the bank a leverage of 87.5%. In addition, the time to maturity is one year and
the risk-free rate is r = 1% and α = 0.8.
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is consistent with a regulator that is more intolerant of high levels of risk, and who applies
more severe regulatory corrective measures.
Proposition 3 below shows that severe regulatory corrective actions can have the adverse
effect of increasing the equilibrium level of asset risk chosen in a bargaining process. This
occurs when the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) subdebtholders are willing to
increase asset risk above its initial level, i.e., VC,t < H
∗∗
Sub, (2) yet, the subdebtholders do not
agree to increase asset risk to the level that maximizes the value of the bank’s stock, i.e.,
BSub,t(σ
max
Stk ) < BSub,t(σ0), and (3) the stockholders’ bargaining power α is sufficiently high.
The intuition behind this result is that when the stockholders’ bargaining power is suf-
ficiently high, what restricts the equilibrium level of asset risk is that it must make sub-
debtholders better off relative to the initial level of risk (which is used as the threat point
in the bargaining process). Decreasing the initial level of asset risk decreases the value of
the subdebt when bargaining fails, allowing the stockholders to persuade the subdebtholders
to agree to a higher equilibrium level of asset risk that produces a lower value of subdebt.
Formally:
Proposition 3. Assume that the bank is jointly controlled by the subdebtholders and the
stockholders and that VC,t < H
∗∗
Sub. Further assume that Bsub,t(σ
max
Stk ) < Bsub,t(σ0). Then for
each σ′ < σ0, there exists α < 1 such that the equilibrium level of asset risk is higher when
the initial level of asset risk decreases from σ0 to σ
′, i.e., σmaxα (σ0) < σ
max
α (σ
′), for each
α > α.
The proof of Proposition 3 is presented in Appendix B.3.
In the example in Section 4.3 we show that when σ′ = 10%, the equilibrium level of
asset risk is σmaxα=0.8(10%) = 40.6%. If the initial level of asset risk increases to σ0 = 15%, the
equilibrium level of asset risk decreases to σmaxα=0.8(15%) = 35.3%, as illustrated in Figure 5.
The result in Proposition 3, that equilibrium risk is decreasing at the initial level of
asset risk, is further demonstrated in Figure 6, which presents the equilibrium level of asset
risk when the initial level of risk is 10% (in dark blue) versus when the initial level of
risk is 20% (in light pink) and for α = 0.8 (dotted) and α = 0.2 (dashed). The figure
demonstrates that our result may be relevant under more circumstances than the ones for
which it is proven in Proposition 3. In particular, given the values of the parameters in
Figure 5, numeric analysis shows that the result holds for any value of the stockholders’
bargaining power, α. The intuition behind the result presented in the figure for the case
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Figure 5: The value of the bank’s subdebt versus the borrower’s level of asset risk for different
initial levels of asset risk. The face value of the borrower’s debt is FC = 80. The face value of the bank’s
deposits is FDep = 60 and the face value of its subordinated debt is FSub = 10. In addition, the time to
maturity is one year, the risk free-rate is r = 1%, and α = 0.8. The dotted and dashed lines represent the
value of subdebt with levels of asset risk of 10% and 15%, respectively.
where α = 0.2 is as follows. When the level of risk is 20% the subdebtholders’ payoff is very
close to their maximal payoff, i.e., their payoff using their optimal level of risk. Thus, the
subdebtholders can credibly threaten the bargaining process, in a way that stockholders are
unable to do since their loss from abandoning the bargaining process would be great. This
yields subdebtholders a better bargaining outcome at a lower equilibrium level of risk that
is closer to the subdebtholders’ ideal risk level, and further from the stockholders’ ideal risk
level.
5 Extensions: Side payments and bail-inable debt
In this section we present two extensions of our model. In the first we analyze the effect
of requiring a bank to issue subdebt when side payments between stockholders and sub-
debtholders are possible. In the second extension we analyze the effect of bail-inable debt.
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Figure 6: The borrower’s level of asset risk for different initial levels of asset risk and alphas.
The initial risk, σ0, is 10% for the darker lines and 20% for the lighter lines. The face value of the borrower’s
debt is FC = 80. The face value of the bank’s deposits is FDep = 60 and the face value of its subordinated
debt is FSub = 10. In addition, the time to maturity is one year and the risk-free rate is r = 1%.
5.1 Joint control with side payments
In this section, we consider an extension where the stockholders and subdebtholders jointly
control the bank and the stockholders’ relative bargaining power is α ∈ (0, 1), but now we
introduce the option of side payments paid by the stockholders to the subdebtholders or
vice versa. Side payments allow the paying side to directly influence the receiving side’s risk
preferences by altering their payoff function.
Payments from stockholders to subdebtholders can be implemented by increasing the
interest rate of the subdebt claim above the rate that the subdebtholders would request
without the side payments. Several papers have expressed concerns about this possibility and
suggested that regulators cap the interest payments on subdebt (Furlong and Keeley, 1987;
Calomiris, 1999; Chen and Hasan, 2011). Payments from subdebtholders to stockholders
can be implemented through deviation or threat of deviation from the absolute priority rule
(Weiss, 1990).
In this case, the two sides have to jointly decide on (1) how much to allow the borrower
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to increase the level of asset risk (if at all) and (2) how much to require the stockholders to
pay to the subdebtholders in a side payment of Xα dollars (which might be either positive or
negative). The following simple lemma shows that the Nash bargaining solution of the two
joint decisions can be solved by a two-step solution as follows: the two sides jointly choose
(1) the level of asset risk that maximizes the sum of their claims, and (2) the side payment
that is the unique Nash solution to the bargaining problem of dividing the joint value of the
claims between the two parties.
Lemma 1. The level of asset risk induced by the Nash solution of the bargaining between
the bank’s stockholders and subdebtholders with side payments is the one that maximizes the
sum of the stock and the subdebt values. Therefore, the equilibrium level of risk with side
payments is identical to the level of risk in a bank with only stock and deposits.
Proof. Consider a case in which the two sides agree on asset risk σ and a side payment of x.
This case induces a payoff of (SB(σ)− x) to the stockholders and a payoff of (BSub(σ) + x)
to the subdebtholders. Therefore, the set of all feasible payoff profiles induced by asset risk
σ and an arbitrary side payment is the 45-degree line of all payoff profiles (ustk, usub) that
sum to SB(σ)+BSub(σ) (i.e., ustk + usub = SB(σ) +BSub(σ)). This, in turn, implies that the
Pareto frontier of the set of feasible payoff profiles is the one induced by the level of asset
risk that maximizes SB(σ) + BSub(σ). Since the Nash bargaining solution always chooses a
point in the Pareto frontier of the set of feasible payoff profiles, the bargaining Nash solution
chooses the level of asset risk that maximizes the sum of values of the stockholders’ claim
and subdebtholders’ claim.
Lemma 1 implies that the analysis of bargaining with side payments requires first a
characterization of how the total value of both the subdebt and the stock depends on the
level of risk, which is done in Section 5.1.1, and then an application of this analysis to the
solution of the bargaining situation with side payments, which is shown in Section 5.1.2.
5.1.1 Analysis of the sum of claims: Stock and subdebt
The joint payoff of stockholders and subdebtholders is the sum of payoffs from Eq. (3) and
Eq. (4):
SB,t +BSub,t = Callt(VC,t, FDep, σ, T − t, r)− Callt(VC,t, FC , σ, T − t, r). (19)
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This payoff is identical to the payoff of the stockholders in the case of a bank funded
solely by deposits and stock, discussed in Section 3.5. In both cases, the party in control
can increase its payoff by extracting value only from the depositors. This means that if side
payments are possible, the depositors and the deposit insurer will not benefit from regulation
requiring banks to issue subdebt to replace stock; in fact, the state of the depositors and the
deposit insurer will not change at all.
Our entire analysis in Section 3.5 applies to a bank with subordinated debt where risk-
taking is chosen in a bargaining process between the stockholders and subdebtholders and
where side payments are possible. Therefore, the threshold below which there is risk-shifting
is between the thresholds for risk-shifting for the subdebt and for the stock, i.e., H∗∗Sub <
H∗∗SB+Bsub < H
∗∗
Stk. In addition, the level of asset risk that maximizes the total value of the
two claims is between the level that maximizes the value of the subdebt and the level that
maximizes the value of the stock, σmaxsub < σ
max
SB+Bsub
< σmaxStk . It is interesting to observe that
the thresholds in this case, H∗SB+Bsub and H
∗∗
SB+Bsub
, and the risk level that maximizes the
payoff, σmaxSB+Bsub , do not depend on the size of the subdebt or on the relative bargaining
power, α.
5.1.2 Bargaining solution with side payments
Corollary 5 immediately implies the following characterization of risk-shifting in the Nash
bargaining solution in the case of joint control of the bank with side payments.
Corollary 7. When the bank is jointly controlled by the subdebtholders and the stockholders
and side payments are feasible, risk-shifting occurs if and only if VC,t < H
∗∗
SB+Bsub
. When there
is risk-shifting, the level of risk-shifting (that is independent of α) is σmaxSB+Bsub ∈ (σmaxBsub , σmaxSB ).
Observe that the introduction of side payments increases the range of market values of the
asset for which risk-shifting occurs. Specifically, without side payments risk-shifting occurs
if and only if VC,t < H
∗∗
Sub, but with side payments risk-shifting also occurs in the interval
H∗∗Sub < VC,t < H
∗∗
SB+Bsub
.
Finally, we briefly analyze the side payments between the two sides. The side payments
are used if and only if there is risk-shifting (i.e., if VC,t < H
∗∗
SB+Bsub
). In this case, the
(possibly negative) amount xα that the stockholders pay to the subdebtholders is equal to
argmax
x∈R
((
SB,t
(
σmaxSB+Bsub
)
− SB,t (σ0)− xα
)α · (BSub,t (σmaxSB+Bsub)− BSub,t (σ0) + xα)1−α) .
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Observe that the side payment xα is decreasing with α; i.e., the lower the stockholders’
bargaining power α, the higher their side payment to the subdebtholders.
5.2 Bail-in debt and risk-taking
In this section we replace the standard debt discussed in the previous sections with a bail-
inable debt. Bail-in debt is a tool available to regulators who are dealing with a bank in
financial distress and responsible for managing the failure in an orderly fashion, i.e., preserv-
ing financial stability and continuity of bank operation while protecting insured deposits and
public funds (Chennells and Wingfield, 2015). In a bail-in event the claims of shareholders
and unsecured creditors of the distressed bank are written down or converted into equity
and consequently losses are absorbed and the bank is recapitalized. The bail-in debt is not
negotiated at the time of distress; instead, it is imposed by the regulator. Under the new
resolution arrangements in the European Union, a resolution that involves a bail-in of a bank
must be accompanied by a restructuring plan (Chennells and Wingfield, 2015).
In our model, consistent with existing works (e.g., ?), we refer to bail-inable debt as a
debt claim that at the time of distress can be decreased in size, i.e., written down, at the
discretion of the regulator. As discussed above, the regulator is informed of the state of
the bank only at the time of an audit event. Therefore, a bail-in event can occur between
audits only following a voluntary disclosure of information by one of the bank’s claimholders,
whether the debtholder or the stockholder. Claimholders will only disclose such information
if they are made better off by it.
Once the regulator is informed of the state of the bank, a write-down of debt is enforced,
decreasing the face value of debt by ∆ percent. In addition, the level of asset risk is fixed
to its initial level, σ0. Both the new level of asset risk set by the regulator and the new
face value of debt in the case of a bail-in event are known in advance. After regulatory
intervention it is no longer possible to shift risk in the time remaining until the next audit,
T . We assume that an informed regulator decides to bail in a bank whenever the borrower’s
asset value is below the face value of the borrower’s debt VC,t < FC . This means that a
bail-in event can occur for any asset value in which either the debtholder or the stockholder
is motivated to increase risk. The value of the bank’s stock following a bail-in event is
S∆B,t (σ0) = Callt(VC,t, FDep + FSub(1−∆), σo, T − t, r)− Callt(VC,t, FC , σ0, T − t, r),
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and the value of subdebt following a bail-in event is
B∆Sub,t (σ0) = Callt(VC,t, FDep, σ0, T − t, r)− Callt(VC,t, FDep + FSub(1−∆), σo, T − t, r).
Applying the same solution concept used in Section 4 (namely, an asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution), we find that the maximal level of asset risk that is chosen at the end
of the bargaining process is
σmax(α,∆) = argmax σ≥σ0
SB,t(σ)≥S
∆
B,t
(σ0)
BSub,t(σ)≥B
∆
Sub,t
(σ0)
(
SB,t (σ)− S∆B,t (σ0)
)α · (BSub,t (σ)− B∆Sub,t (σ0))1−α . (20)
Since the bail-in event makes the debtholders worse off relative to the simple bargaining
scenario, the range of levels of asset risk that are not worse than the debtholders’ outside
option increases. This means that the debtholders may agree to higher levels of asset risk
with bail-in than without it.
Proposition 4. When a bank is jointly controlled by bail-inable debtholders and stockholders,
risk-shifting occurs for a range of asset values that is decreasing with ∆. When there is risk-
shifting (1) the level of asset risk σmax(α,∆) is between the level of asset risk that maximizes
the value of debt and the level of asset risk that maximizes the value of stock, i.e., σmaxBSub ≤
σmax(α,∆) ≤ σmaxSB , and (2) the level of asset risk σmax(α,∆) is increasing with ∆.
The proof of Proposition 4 is presented in Appendix B.4.
Figure 7 presents an example of the equilibrium levels of asset risk for different size of
write-downs, ∆. The bargaining power of the stockholders relative to the debtholders is
α = 0.5. In line with Proposition 4, for all values of ∆ presented in the figure, when there is
risk-shifting, the equilibrium level of asset risk is (1) between the level that maximizes the
value of debt and the level that maximizes the value of stock (the dotted and dashed gray
lines, respectively) and (2) increasing with ∆. The second property can be explained by the
fact that as ∆ increases the stockholders’ position in case of no agreement improves, thus
strengthening their position against the subdebtholders in the bargaining game.
In addition, Figure 7 shows that the range of asset values where risk-shifting occurs is
decreasing with the size of the write-down, ∆. In other words, as the transfer from the
debtholders to the stockholders increases, there is a corresponding increase in the range of
asset values for which a bail-in event is triggered and therefore there is no risk-shifting. In
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such a case, the transfer from bailing in the debt compensates the stockholders for the lower
equilibrium level of asset risk.
Figure 8 demonstrates this point for the case where the borrower’s asset value is V = 65.
When the level of the write-down is relatively high, say ∆ = 66.6%, the value of the stock
following a bail-in event is higher than with no bail-in event, including the no-bail-in case
where the level of asset risk equals the stockholders’ preferred level of risk, σmaxstk . Therefore,
when ∆ = 66.6% there is no risk-shifting and a bail-in event is triggered. By contrast, when
the size of the write-down is lower, say ∆ = 33.3%, there is a range of levels of asset risk
that are exceptionable to both the stockholders and the subdebtholders and therefore an
agreement can be reached and risk-shifting will occur. In the case depicted in Figure 8, the
stockholders agree to any level of risk above σ = 18% while the subdebtholders agree to any
level of risk below σ = 49.1% and so the equilibrium level of risk is σmax(α,∆) = 28.7%.
Figure 7 presents the borrower’s level of asset risk for different bail-in levels. It may be
noted that the equilibrium level of asset risk isn’t necessarily monotonically decreasing with
asset value. Instead, equilibrium risk is an increasing function for higher asset values and a
decreasing function for lower asset values. This differs from the cases discussed so far in the
paper in which ∆ = 0, where equilibrium risk is a decreasing function for all asset values
where risk-shifting takes place. To understand this result we look first to the case where there
is no bail-in event. When there is no bail-in event (∆ = 0), the equilibrium level of asset
risk is a compromise between the level of asset risk preferred by the stockholders and the
level of asset risk preferred by the subdebtholders. Since both claimholders’ preferred level
of asset risk is a decreasing function, so is the equilibrium level of asset risk. By contrast,
when there is a bail-in event (∆ > 0), a second element comes into play: the result in case
of disagreement is a transfer of wealth from the subdebtholders to the stockholders. When
asset value is very low, the value of the bail-in event is low and therefore the first element
dominates. This is why for very low asset values the equilibrium levels of asset risk converge
to the equilibrium level of asset risk with no bail-in event. By contrast, for higher asset
values, closer to FDep + FSub(1−∆), the second element begins to dominate.
Lastly, as described in Figure 7, when the bank is in severe financial distress, the equi-
librium level of asset risk is higher than the equilibrium level of asset risk with no subdebt
(solid gray line). By contrast, when the bank is in mild distress, i.e., with asset values
closer to FDep + FSub, the equilibrium level of asset risk with bail-inable debt is lower than
the equilibrium risk in a bank with no subdebt. Therefore, if the regulator can credibly
31
Figure 7: The borrower’s level of asset risk for different bail-in levels. The dashed and dotted
gray lines represent the preferred levels of asset risk of the stockholders and the subdebtholders, respectively.
The initial risk, σ0, is 10% and α = 0.5. The face value of the borrower’s debt is FC = 80. The face value of
the bank’s deposits is FDep = 60 and the face value of its subordinated debt is FSub = 10. In addition, the
time to maturity is one year and the risk-free rate is r = 1%.
find out that a bank is distressed before it is in severe financial distress, bail-inable debt is
a good regulatory tool for limiting risk-shifting, even though it transfers wealth from the
debtholders to the stockholders. The regulator is more likely to find out that a bank is in
mild distress if the regulator’s audits are relatively frequent. Therefore, for bail-in debt to
be an effective tool for restricting a bank’s risk-taking it must be accompanied by frequent
regulatory audits.
6 A numerical analysis: Changes in capital structure
and in regulatory policy
In this section we present a comprehensive assessment of the effect of different capital struc-
tures and different levels of bargaining power on the equilibrium level of asset risk and on
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Figure 8: The value of the bank’s stock and subdebt for different levels of the borrower’s asset
risk. The dashed and dotted blue lines represent the value of bail-in debt with asset risk σ = 10% and a
write-down of ∆ = 66.6% and ∆ = 33.3%, respectively. The dashed and dotted pink lines represent the
stock value with asset risk σ = 10% and a write-down of ∆ = 66.6% and ∆ = 33.3%, respectively. The
borrower’s asset value is V = 65. The initial risk, σ0, is 10% and α = 0.5. The face value of the borrower’s
debt is FC = 80. The face value of the bank’s deposits is FDep = 60 and the face value of its subordinated
debt is FSub = 10. In addition, the time to maturity is one year and the risk-free rate is r = 1%.
the value of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance, a measure implemented to protect bank
depositors from losses caused by a bank’s inability to repay its debt, is formally defined in
Section 6.1, before we begin our numerical analysis in Section 6.2.
6.1 The cost of deposit insurance
In the case of deposit insurance, if a bank cannot repay its depositors, i.e., the value of the
bank’s assets is below the face value of its deposit at maturity, the government compensates
the depositors with the difference between the two. Thus, the cost of deposit insurance equals
the maximum between zero and the difference between the face value of the secured deposits
and the value of the bank’s assets: DIT = max[FDep − VB,T , 0]. Replacing VB,T above by
Eq. (2) we find that DIT = max[FDep−VC,T , 0]. As discussed in Merton (1977) and Crouhy
and Galai (1991), this payoff is equivalent to a long put option on the corporation’s assets
with a strike price equal to the face value of the bank’s deposits. Following convention,
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we normalize and use the value of deposit insurance per dollar (DIPD) of insured deposits,
which is defined as
DIPDt =
Putt(VC,t, FDep, σ, T − t, r)
FDep
. (21)
As expected, the value of deposit insurance increases with the borrower’s asset risk, and
decreases with its asset value.
6.2 Comparative statics
The analysis is conducted using the base-case parameters discussed in Section 4.3. The face
value of the corporation’s loan is 80, the face value of the subdebt is 10, and the face value
of the deposits is 60. These face values yield an accounting-based leverage of 87.5% for the
bank. In addition, the time to maturity is one year and the risk-free rate is 1%. We consider
an initial level of asset volatility of 10%, similar to the level of risk of investment grade bonds
(Huang and Huang, 2012).
When the bank’s assets are risky debt claims, as in our framework, the highest asset value
for which risk-shifting occurs is the discounted geometric average of the face value of the
borrower’s debt and the total face value of the bank’s debt, which is equal to 73.7. However,
as seen in Table 2, risk-shifting below this threshold occurs only if the bank’s stockholders
possess the control rights. For example, if the corporation’s asset value is 70, risk-shifting
will occur only if stockholders control the bank, in which case the equilibrium level of asset
risk is 33.7% and the value of deposit insurance per dollar of insured deposits is 7.3%.
If the bank is jointly controlled and side payments are possible, risk-shifting can occur for
any asset value below the discounted geometric average of the face value of the borrower’s
debt and the face value of the bank’s deposits, which is equal to 68.3. For example, if the
borrower’s asset value decreases to 65, risk-shifting takes place either when the stockholders
control the bank or when both claimholders jointly control the bank. However, in the first
case, the equilibrium level of asset risk is 51.2%, and the cost of deposit insurance per dollar
of insured deposits (DIPD) is 16.6%. When the bank is jointly controlled and side payments
are possible, the subdebtholders are able to restrict the increase in the equilibrium level of
asset risk to 32.8%, and the cost of deposit insurance is 9.3%.
The case of bargaining with side payments is important, since a capital structure with
subdebt where side payments are possible yields identical results to the case where subdebt
is swapped out by stock. Thus, if the subdebtholders cannot affect the level of risk as in the
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first case, a capital structure with stock only is superior. However, side payments clearly
decrease market monitoring, since if side payments were restricted, subdebtholders would
not agree to an increase in risk at all. As discussed above, while the equilibrium level of
asset risk is unaffected by stockholders’ relative bargaining power, the side payment that the
stockholders must make to the subdebtholders is decreasing with the stockholders’ relative
bargaining power.
The last threshold that effects risk-shifting is the discounted geometric average between
the face value of the deposits and the total face value of the bank’s debt. Below this threshold
risk-shifting occurs even if the subdebtholders have complete control over the level of asset
risk. For example, if the borrower’s asset value is very low (V = 62), risk-shifting can take
place under any level of the claimholders’ bargaining power, but the degree of risk-shifting
increases with the stockholders’ relative bargaining power. The equilibrium level of asset
risk is highest when stockholders have full control, 59.7%, in which case DIPD receives
its highest value of 21.6%. The lowest level of asset risk is observed when subdebtholders
have full control, 26.2% (similarly the cost of DIPD is the lowest at 8.5%). If claimholders
have joint control and side payments are not possible, the equilibrium level of asset risk is
between 26.2% and 59.7%, depending on the relative bargaining power. In the case where
claimholders have joint control and side payments are possible, or if the bank has no subdebt
and is funded by stock and deposits, the equilibrium level of asset risk is 45% and the cost
of DIPD is 15.9%.
A similar picture emerges from Figure 3, which presents the equilibrium level of the
borrower’s asset risk for different levels of bargaining power. We observe the maximum equi-
librium level of asset risk when the bank is controlled by the stockholders, the minimum
equilibrium level of asset risk when the bank is controlled by the subdebtholders, and in-
termediate levels when the bank is jointly controlled. In addition, when the bank is jointly
controlled risk-shifting occurs only for asset values for which the subdebtholders would in-
crease the level of asset risk if they controlled the bank. The effect of side payments on
the equilibrium level of asset risk is ambiguous and depends on the stockholders’ relative
bargaining power. Since the case of side payments is identical to the case of a bank with
no subdebt, it is also true that the effect of replacing subdebt with stock on the equilibrium
level of asset risk is ambiguous and depends on the stockholders’ relative bargaining power.
Specifically, we find that when α is less than 0.45, the introduction of subdebt to replace
stock leads to a decrease in the equilibrium level of asset risk for all asset values. However,
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Table 2: Numerical Analysis: Equilibrium level of asset risk and cost of deposit insurance
Control and bargaining Corporation’s asset value (VC)
framework VC > 73.7 VC = 70 VC = 65 VC = 62
Stockholder control Risk-shifting to 33.7% Risk-shifting to 51.2% Risk-shifting to 59.7%
DIPD=7.3% DIPD=16.6% DIPD=21.6%
No subdebt - Joint control Risk-shifting to 32.8% Risk-shifting to 45.0%
with side payments No risk- Side payment: 1.62/1.28/0.95 Side payment: 1.72/0.98/0.23
α = 0.2/α = 0.5/α = 0.8 shifting DIPD=9.3% DIPD=15.9%
Joint control No risk-shifting Risk-shifting to
α = 0.2/α = 0.5/α = 0.8 No risk-shifting 28.5%/32.9%/40.6%
DIPD: 9.4%/11.2%/14.2%
Subdebtholder control Risk-shifting to 26.2%
DIPD=8.5%
The numerical analysis refers to the case where the face value of the borrower’s debt is FC = 80. The face
value of the bank’s deposits is FDep = 60 and the face value of its subordinated debt is Fsub = 10. The initial
level of asset risk is σ0 = 10%. The risk-free rate is r = 1% and the time to maturity is one year. The table
presents the equilibrium level of asset risk as well as the cost of deposit insurance, in terms of the percentage
of the face value of deposits, for different levels of asset value and subdebtholders’ bargaining power.
when α is greater than 0.45, the equilibrium level of asset risk with subdebt is higher than
in a bank with no subdebt for low enough asset values. For example, when α = 0.8, the
introduction of subdebt leads to a lower equilibrium level of asset risk for asset values above
61.1.
Figure 9 presents the bank’s cost of deposit insurance per dollar of insured deposits. A
higher level of equilibrium risk translates into a higher cost of deposit insurance.
7 Conclusion
The common belief among policymakers and regulators before the financial crisis of 2007–
2009 was that subordinated debt can effectively reduce financial institutions’ risk-taking.
However, the crisis called into question the effectiveness of such debt instruments as many fi-
nancial institutions with subdebt were bailed out using taxpayers’ money. Still, the empirical
literature shows that during the crisis period subordinated debt reduced banks’ risk-taking.
As a response to the crisis and the usage of taxpayer money to bail out banks, regulators
began developing “bail-in” tools – unsecured debt that is written down or converted into
equity in time of financial distress. Motivated by these events and reforms we study how
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Figure 9: Value of deposit insurance per dollar of insured deposits. The figure depicts the value
of a bank’s deposit insurance per dollar of insured deposits in a bank with subdebt where the level of asset
risk is determined in a bargaining process between the bank’s claimholders (as defined in Eq. (18)) for
three different values of the stockholders’ bargaining power relative to the subdebtholders’: (1) α = 0.8, (2)
α = 0.5, and (3) α = 0.2. In addition, the figure depicts the equilibrium levels of asset risk in a bank with
subdebt that is controlled by stockholders (Section 3.3), a bank with subdebt controlled by subdebtholders
(Section 3.4), and a bank with no subdebt (Section 3.5). The face value of the borrower’s debt is FC = 80.
The face value of the bank’s deposits is FDep = 60 and the face value of its subordinated debt is Fsub = 10.
The initial level of risk is σ0 = 10%. In addition, the time to maturity is one year and the risk-free rate is
r = 1%.
risk-taking is affected when part of a bank’s common equity is replaced with subordinated
debt or with bail-inable debt, given the relative bargaining power of the subdebtholder.
We find that substituting a portion of a bank’s stock with subdebt decreases the range of
asset values for which risk-shifting takes place, since subdebtholders must be better off after
the negotiation. When risk-shifting does occur, the equilibrium level of asset risk is between
the level that maximizes the value of the stock and the level that maximizes the value of
the subdebt, and this equilibrium level of asset risk is decreasing with the subdebtholders’
bargaining power. In addition, we show that substituting part of a bank’s stock with subdebt
can increase the equilibrium level of asset risk if the subdebtholders’ bargaining power is not
sufficiently high.
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Next we extended the model to the case of bail-inable debt, i.e., debt that is written
down by a known percent at the time of financial distress. We find that when there is risk-
shifting, the equilibrium level of asset risk is between the level that maximizes the value of
debt and the level that maximizes the value of stock. Moreover, asset risk is increasing with
the size of the write-down. In addition, the range of asset values where risk-shifting occurs
is decreasing with the size of the write-down, so that as the transfer from debtholders to
stockholders increases, the range of assets for which there is no risk-shifting and a bail-in
event occurs increases as well.
We address a concern raised in previous literature, by allowing side payments between
the stockholders and the subdebtholders. We find that with side payments, both the asset
value threshold for risk-shifting and the equilibrium level of asset risk are identical to those
of a bank funded by just stock and deposits. Thus, if side payments are a concern, requesting
that banks issue subdebt does not affect their risk-taking.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the issue of bank transparency was debated. The Basel
III international regulatory framework calls for financial institutions to increase transparency
by conducting stress tests involving an unprecedented amount of disclosure. On the one
hand, transparency can prevent excessive risk-shifting by banks. On the other hand, it is
often argued that transparency has significant disadvantages in banking, given the role of
banks in liquidity provision and risk-sharing. We contribute to this debate by showing that
as the level of asset risk determined at a regulatory audit decreases, the equilibrium level
of asset risk increases (when the bargaining power of the stockholders is sufficiently high).
As a result, a more restrictive corrective measure imposed by the regulator can motivate
claimholders to agree on a higher level of asset risk in the bargaining process. Thus, the
efficiency of subdebt as a disciplinary tool may decline with the enforcement of traditional
regulatory tools such as on-site supervision.
38
Appendix A: Notation
The bank’s borrower (the corporation)
SC Value of borrower’s stock.
FC Face value of borrower’s debt.
BC Value of borrower’s debt.
T Time of next regulatory audit.
VC Value of borrower’s assets.
µ Instantaneous expected return on borrower’s assets.
σ Instantaneous volatility of borrower’s assets (asset risk).
σ0 Initial level of asset risk.
The bank
VB Value of bank’s assets.
SB Value of bank’s stock.
FDep Face value of deposits.
BDep Value of deposits.
FSub Face value of subdebt.
BSub Market value of subdebt.
H∗Stk Threshold below which the bank’s stockholders prefer risk higher than zero.
H∗∗Stk Threshold below which the bank’s stockholders prefer risk higher than the initial risk.
σmaxStk Stockholders’ preferred level of asset risk when VC < H
∗
Stk.
H∗Sub Threshold below which the subdebtholders prefer risk higher than zero.
H∗∗Sub Threshold below which the subdebtholders prefer risk higher than the initial risk.
σmaxSub Subdebtholders’ preferred level of asset risk when H
∗
Sub < VC,t.
α Bargaining power of the stockholders relative to the subdebtholders.
σmaxα Preferred asset risk when stockholders and subdebtholders have joint control.
Xα Side payment.
H∗SB+Bsub Threshold below which the bank’s claimholders prefer risk higher than zero.
H∗∗SB+Bsub Threshold below which the bank’s claimholders prefer risk higher than the initial risk.
σmaxSB+Bsub Preferred risk with side payments.
∆ Debt write-down (%).
S∆B,t(σ0) Value of bank’s stock following a bail-in event.
B∆Sub,t (σ0) Market value of subdebt following a bail-in event.
σmax(α,∆) Preferred asset risk with joint control and bail-in.
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Appendix B: Proofs
B.1 Proposition 1: Auxiliary Result
Recall that the portfolio of two call options is given by
Pt(Vt, F1, F2, σ, T − t, r) = Callt(Vt, F1, σ, T − t, r)− Callt(Vt, F2, σ, T − t, r).
To find the level of asset risk that maximizes the portfolio’s value we use the derivative
of the value of each call option with respect to asset risk:
∂callt
∂σ
=
√
T√
2pi
· V · e− 12 ·(d1(Fi))2 ,
where d1 =
1
σ
√
T−t ·
[
ln
(
Vt
Fi
)
+
(
r + 1
2
σ2
)
· (T − t)
]
, to get
∂Pt
∂σ
=
√
T√
2pi
· V·e−
1
2
·(d1(F1))2 −
√
T√
2pi
· Vt · e−
1
2
·(d1(F2))2 .
After rearranging it can be shown that the derivative is equal to
∂Pt
∂σ
=
√
T − t√
2pi
· Vt · e−
1
2·T ·σ2
[
ea − eb
]
,
where a and b are defined as
a = −2 · lnVt · lnF1 + (ln(F1))2 − 2 · ln (F1) ·
(
r +
σ2
2
)
· (T − t)
b = −2 · lnVt · lnF2 + (ln(F2))2 − 2 · ln (F2) ·
(
r +
σ2
2
)
· (T − t).
The payoff is maximized with respect to the level of asset risk in cases where the first
derivative equals zero. This happens when either Vt = 0 or a = b. Since the first option is
of no interest economically we focus on the second option. We find that a = b when
Vt = e
−(r+ 12σ2)·(T−t) ·
√
F1 · F2. (B.1)
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Observe that Eq. (B.1) has a solution if and only if Vt < H
∗(F1, F2, T−t, r) ≡ e−r(T−t)
√
F1 · F2.
It is simple to verify that (1) when Eq. (B.1) has a solution, the derivative is positive for
lower levels of risk and it is negative for higher level of risks, which implies that the portfo-
lio’s value is hump-shaped and (2) in the opposite case (i.e., Vt > H
∗(F1, F2, T − t, r, )), the
derivative is always negative, and the portfolio’s value is decreasing with asset risk (which
proves part (1) of Prop. 1). Further observe that the level of asset risk σ that solves Eq.
(B.1) is greater than σ0 iff
Vt > H
∗∗(F1, F2, T − t, r, σ0) ≡ e
−
(
r+
σ20
2
)
(T−t)√
F1 · F2. (B.2)
Next, we isolate σ in Eq. (B.1) (in the case in which H∗(F1, F2, T − t, r) > Vt), and we
obtain the following equation for the level of asset risk that maximizes the portfolio’s value:
argmaxσ(Pt) = σ
max(Vt, F1, F2, T − t, r) =
√
1
T − t ln
(
F1 · F2
(Vt)
2
)
− 2r, (B.3)
which proves part (3) of Proposition 1.
B.2 Proposition 2: Solution of the bargaining game
We begin by showing that risk-shifting occurs if and only if VC,t < H
∗∗
Sub. Corollary 3 implies
that there exists a higher level of asset risk σ > σ0 that induces a higher value for the
subdebt relative to the initial level of risk, if and only if VC,t < H
∗∗
Sub. Moreover, by Corollary
1 and inequality H∗∗Sub < H
∗∗
Stk, if the subdebtholders achieve a higher value for the subdebt
(relative to its value given the initial risk), so do the stockholders. Thus, by Eq. (18), which
defines the equilibrium level of risk, there exists a higher level of risk σ > σ0 that induces
a higher value for both the stock and the subdebt than the value induced for them by the
initial risk, if and only if VC,t < H
∗∗
Sub.
Next, we focus on the case where risk-shifting occurs (i.e., VC,t < H
∗∗
Sub). We can con-
clude from Corollaries 1 and 3 that (1) both the expressions (SB,t (σ)− SB,t (σ0)) and
(BSub,t (σ)−BSub,t (σ0)) are increasing with σ for low levels of asset risk satisfying σ < σmaxSub ,
(2) (SB,t (σ) − SB,t (σ0)) is increasing with σ, while (BSub,t (σ)− BSub,t (σ0)) is decreasing
with σ, for intermediate levels of asset risk satisfying σmaxSub < σ < σ
max
Stk , and (3) both ex-
pressions are decreasing with σ for high levels of asset risk satisfying σ > σmaxStk . These
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observations and the definition of σmaxα in Eq. (18) imply that σ
max
α is increasing with α,
and that σmaxSub ≤ σmaxα ≤ σmaxStk .
B.3 Proposition 3: Impact of initial level of asset risk
The assumption that VC,t < H
∗∗
Sub implies by Proposition 2 that there is risk-shifting, since
the payoff functions of both the stockholders and the subdebtholders are hump-shaped, and
that the levels of asset risk that maximize the values of the stock and the subdebt satisfy
σ0 < σ
max
Sub < σ
max
Stk . Let σ0 > σ0 (resp., σ
′ > σ′) be the level of asset risk that induces the same
payoff for the subdebtholders as the one induced by the initial risk level, i.e., Bsub,t(σ0) =
Bsub,t(σ0) (resp., Bsub,t
(
σ′
)
= Bsub,t(σ
′)). The inequality Bsub,t(σmaxStk ) < Bsub,t(σ0) and the
definition of the Nash bargaining solution imply that σmaxα (σ0) < σ0 < σ
max
Stk for each level
of bargaining power α. Next, observe that σmaxα (σ
′) converges to min(σ′, σmaxStk ) > σ0 as α
converges to 1. This implies that there exists α < 1 such that σmaxα (σ0) < σ0 < σ
max
α (σ
′) for
each α > α.
B.4 Proposition 4: Bail-in debt
We begin by showing that the range of asset values for which risk-shifting occurs is decreasing
with ∆ > 0. Define RS(∆) as the interval of asset values for which there is risk-shifting. We
show that for ∆′ < ∆ if VC ∈ RS(∆) it must also be that VC ∈ RS(∆′). Since VC ∈ RS(∆)
there must be a σ > σ0 such that SB,t(σ) ≥ S∆B,t(σ0) and BSub,t(σ) ≥ B∆Sub,t(σ0); i.e., there
is a level of asset risk such that both the stockholders and the subdebtholders are better
off than with the initial level of asset risk and a bail-in event. In particular, it implies that
SB,t(σ) + BSub,t(σ) ≥ SB,t(σ0) + BSub,t(σ0).
Observe that BSub,t(σ0) ≥ B∆′Sub,t(σ0), i.e., the subdebtholders weakly prefer not having a
bail-in event. Let σ′ ∈ (σ0, σ] be the maximal level of risk such that BSub,t(σ′) ≥ B∆′Sub,t(σ0).
If σ′ = σ, then it is immediate that both claimholders gain from a risk-shifting to σ with a
bail-in level of ∆′ (the subdebtholders’ gain is implied by substituting σ′ = σ in the previous
inequality, and the stockholders’ gain is implied by the fact that ∆′ < ∆), which implies
that VC ∈ RS(∆′). We are left with the case of σ′ < σ. From the continuity of BSub,t we
know that BSub,t(σ
′) = B∆
′
Sub,t(σ0).
By Proposition 1 the inequality SB,t(σ) + BSub,t(σ) ≥ SB,t(σ0) + BSub,t(σ0) implies that
the shape of SB,t(σ) + BSub,t(σ) is hump-shaped in the asset risk σ (i.e., VC < H
∗∗
Stk+Sub)
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and that the initial risk is smaller than the risk inducing the maximal sum of values of
the two claimholders (i.e., σ0 < σ
max
Stk+Sub). This implies that for any σ
′ ∈ (σ0, σ] it is true
that SB,t(σ
′) + BSub,t(σ′) ≥ SB,t(σ0) + BSub,t(σ0) = S∆′B,t(σ0) + B∆
′
Sub,t(σ0). This implies that
SB,t(σ
′) ≥ S∆′B,t(σ0), which, in turn, implies that both claimholders gain from risk-shifting to
σ with a bail-in level of ∆′, and thus VC ∈ RS(∆′).
Next, we focus on the equilibrium level of asset risk. Following the same logic described
in the proof of Proposition 2, we find that the level of asset risk σmax(α,∆) is between the level
of asset risk that maximizes the value of debt and the level of asset risk that maximizes
the value of stock. Lastly, we show that the level of asset risk σmax(α,∆) is increasing with ∆.
Since S∆B,t(σ0) is increasing with ∆, the compensation that the stockholder will demand for
increasing risk increases. This means that the equilibrium level of asset risk must increase
with ∆ as well.
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